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MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER’S 
EXCEPTIONALISM IN  
FIFA’S TRANSFER SYSTEM: 
FOR HOW MUCH LONGER? 
 
REMO DECURTINS* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
It is widely recognized that in the United States, soccer is not as popular as 
it is in the rest of the world.  Major League Soccer (MLS) does not compete in 
terms of importance with the four major American sports leagues.1   
Internationally, MLS is followed only marginally, if at all, and usually only 
makes headlines when an aging star decides to join the league, such as in the 
last few years with Steven Gerrard, Andrea Pirlo, Kakà, Didier Drogba, 
Frank Lampard, or Bastian Schweinsteiger. 
In the foreseeable future, MLS may depart from its wallflower existence.  
During its twenty-one years, the league has experienced a positive develop-
ment, both from a sporting and an economic perspective.  MLS’ self-
proclaimed,  
ambitious goal is to become one of the major soccer leagues in the world by 
2022.2  Without a doubt, there is the necessary economic potential in the U.S. 
sports market for the league to get there.  Crucial will be whether MLS will 
succeed in the balancing act between the requirements of a league in a U.S. 
sports environment and a league as part of the FIFA3 framework.4 
                                                
* Master of Law (2010, University of Lucerne, Switzerland); LL.M. (2016, New York Universi-
ty).  The author is a Swiss lawyer who is currently working in a law firm in New York.  This article is 
based on the author’s recent German article Sonderfall Major League Soccer in FIFA-Transferwesen: 
Wie lange noch? in the Swiss/German/Austrian Sports law journal CAUSA SPORT (3/2016, 240–51).  
1. The National Football League (NFL), the National Basketball Association (NBA), Major 
League Baseball (MLB), and the National Hockey League (NHL). 
2. Chris Smith, MLS Commissioner Don Garber on the League at Twenty Years, FORBES (Dec. 2, 
2015), www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2015/12/02/mls-commissioner-don-garber-on-the-league-at-
twenty-years/#462d8cde285b. 
3. The Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) is the international governing 
body of association football.  FIFA has its headquarters in Zurich, Switzerland. 
4. See Diana C. Taylor, Aimed at the Goal? The Sustainability of Major League Soccer's Struc-
ture, 9 WILLAMETTE SPORTS L.J. 1, 19 (2011). 
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Due to its current organizational structure, MLS is characterized as an 
American sports league.  In particular, this manifests itself in its transfer sys-
tem.  Regular MLS players cannot choose their own employer; rather, they are  
allotted to a team by the league.  Also, their salary is kept artificially low due 
to a salary cap.  Such regulations are completely unknown in European  
professional soccer, and they also have a great impact on MLS’ international 
competitiveness. 
Following a brief introduction of MLS’ structure, which is unique even for 
a U.S. sports league5 (Parts II & III), this article will examine how MLS’ 
transfer system significantly differs from international practices in FIFA’s 
transfer  
system (Parts IV & V), what impact this has, and for what reasons MLS’ 
transfer system is increasingly coming under pressure (Part VI). 
 
II.  BACKGROUND OF MLS’ STRUCTURAL PECULIARITIES  
 
A.    Origin and Basics of the Single-Entity Structure 
The modern era of soccer in the U.S. began in the mid-1990s when the 
U.S. successfully hosted the 1994 World Cup.  In exchange for being awarded 
the right to host this tournament, the national governing body of soccer in the 
U.S., the United States Soccer Federation (USSF), had to promise FIFA it 
would  
establish a professional soccer league.6  This was realized by launching MLS 
in 1996. 
From 1968 to 1985, there had already existed a professional soccer league 
in the U.S., the North American Soccer League (NASL).  In the late 1970s, 
this league was able to attract the global soccer icons Pelé, Franz Beckenbau-
er, and Johan Cruyff.  Hence, for a few years, the “focal point of world soc-
cer” had been on the U.S.7  However, the league did not manage to have sus-
tainable  
success.  Excessive player salaries, the lack of centralized control, as well as a 
heterogeneous soccer market resulted in “wide disparities in the financial  
resources of the league’s independently owned teams[,]” which finally led to 
the league’s demise in 1985.8 
                                                
5. See Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C. (Fraser II), 284 F.3d 47, 53 (1st Cir. 2002). 
6. Id. at 52–53. 
7. See Tyler A. Coppage, Comment, Taking the Training Wheels Off MLS: Why the Single Entity 
Antitrust Exemption Should No Longer Apply, 25 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 545, 548 (2015). 
8. See Fraser II, 284 F.3d at 52. 
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When MLS was conceptualized, lessons from these historical mistakes 
were drawn.  The intent was to prevent a similar fate by implementing a cen-
tralized control of the financial equilibrium between the teams and a salary 
cap.9  In order to create competitive balance in the interest of the league as a 
whole, the central resource “players” would have to be allocated by the league.  
It is within these parameters that in the mid-1990s, Alan Rothenberg, a Los 
Angeles lawyer and then-President of the USSF, designed MLS on the draw-
ing board.  He  
structured the league as an entity of separately operated units (“single-entity 
structure”) in the legal form of a limited liability company (LLC)10 under  
Delaware law, with the units being individual MLS teams.  According to the 
“MLS Agreement,” which governs the league’s structure and mode of  
operation, MLS is owned by a group of independent investors.  They may ei-
ther acquire the exclusive right to operate one or several MLS teams as an  
“investor-operator” or remain passive.  Not unlike the distribution of dividends 
to shareholders in a corporation, the profits (and losses) of MLS are distributed 
to its investors.  The individual investors thus have a direct economic interest 
in the financial well-being of the league as a whole. 
The authority to manage the business and affairs of MLS is vested with 
the board of governors, consisting of representatives of each of the investors.  
The board appoints a League Commissioner to whom the day-to-day man-
agement of the league is delegated.  This means that MLS monitors and con-
trols both the league and the individual teams.  MLS is solely responsible for 
recruiting  
players, for negotiating and paying their salaries, and also for determining 
where each of them will play.  The players are thus employees of the league 
rather than of the individual teams.  Furthermore, the league, among others, is 
originally entitled to all intellectual property rights, ticketing income, and 
broadcasting rights. 
 The limited rights and obligations of the investors regarding their “own” 
team derive from an “Operating Agreement” with MLS.  Among others, they 
are obliged to hire, at their own expense and discretion, the coaches and other 
staff.  In return, they periodically receive from the league a management fee, 
mainly consisting of 50% of the team-specific ticket and stadium revenues, as 
well as revenue from local sponsorship and television broadcast rights.  As a 
result, investors not only benefit from sharing equally in the league’s profits 
                                                
9. For MLS’s structure, see id. at 52–55; see also Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C. (Fraser 
I), 97 F. Supp. 2d 130, 132–33 (D. Mass. 2000); see also PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., SPORTS AND THE 
LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 290–92, 383–85 (5th ed. 2015). 
10. “An LLC is a form of statutory business organization that combines some of the advantages 
of a partnership with some of the advantages of a corporation.”  Fraser I, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 134. 
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and losses, but they also benefit on an individual basis, if and to the extent that 
their team attracts interest. 
 
B.    Early Success in the Courtroom 
Not long after its launch, MLS faced a judicial challenge to its structure 
from an antitrust perspective.  In February 1997, eight named players,  
representing all MLS players at the time, filed a class action against MLS,  
various investors, and the USSF with the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts.11  Primarily, they claimed the single-entity structure is an ille-
gal restraint of trade pursuant to the Sherman Antitrust Act (Sherman Act).12   
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits every contract or conspiracy among 
two or more economic actors in restraint of interstate trade or commerce. 
 American sports leagues, which typically feature organizational  
characteristics that restrict the players’ market (e.g., drafts, limited free agency 
and salary caps),13 time and again have seen themselves confronted with 
claims concerning concerted action that potentially may be in breach of the 
Sherman Act.  In effect, they repeatedly had to endure antitrust lawsuits.14  In 
these  
previous proceedings, the leagues had often resorted to the argument that they 
were organized as a single-entity, and as such could not conspire in violation 
of § 1 of the Sherman Act.15  The basis for this argumentation was the Cop-
perweld Corp. v. Independent Tube Corp. decision of the U.S. Supreme Court 
in 1984,16 which established that a parent and its wholly-owned subsidiary are 
not subject to attack under § 1 of the Sherman Act for agreements among 
them.  As a result of the “complete unity of interests” shared by the parent and 
its wholly owned subsidiary, a single economic actor is concerned and is not a 
cooperative  
arrangement between independent competitors covered by § 1 of the Sherman 
Act.  However, the courts usually would not follow the single-entity  
                                                
11. Fraser I, 97 F. Supp. 2d 130. 
12. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2016); Fraser I, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 137−38. 
13. See infra Part IV. 
14. Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 609 (8th Cir. 1976); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 
1173, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1978).  For a long time, Major League Baseball for historically evolved reasons 
had enjoyed immunity from antitrust scrutiny.  See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972).  This  
immunity was partially repealed by the Curt Flood Act in 1998. Pub. L. No. 105-297, 112 Stat. 2824 
(1998).  For material on antitrust and American sports leagues, see WEILER ET AL., supra note 9, at 
204–06, 261–63. 
15. See WEILER ET AL., supra note 9, at 282–83. 
16. Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984). 
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argumentation of the major sports leagues as they would not be deemed to be 
organized as a functional entity, but rather as a joint venture, formed by large-
ly independently operated teams.  According to the courts, each team would 
pursue individual interests different from the interests of the league, namely 
the interest of winning soccer games and ultimately of having economic suc-
cess.  Thus, there would be no unity of interests in the league’s structure as 
would be  
necessary for the single-entity immunity to apply.17 
Besides the need for a subsidy for joint growth, the hope to evade from be-
ing subject to attack under § 1 of the Sherman Act has also been a major rea-
son for conceptualizing MLS as a single-entity.  In the year 2000, MLS  
eventually achieved a success in the courtroom, which arguably proved to be 
essential for the survival of the league.  In the context of summary judgment 
proceedings, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, by  
following the Copperweld decision, characterized MLS as a single-entity that 
as such could not conspire in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.18  The court 
compared MLS to a corporation, with its investor-operator treated as directors 
and shareholders.  According to the court, the investor-operators do not engage 
in concerted action as long as they “are not acting to promote an interest, from 
which they would directly benefit, that is independent from the corporation’s 
success.”19 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, however, upon appeal by 
the players, put a question mark on this single-entity qualification.20  Accord-
ing to the appellate court, MLS’ structure cannot be compared with the  
parent/wholly-owned subsidiary scenario underlying the Copperweld decision.  
Rather, “MLS and its operator-investors comprise a hybrid arrangement,  
somewhere between a single company (with or without wholly-owned  
subsidiaries) and a cooperative arrangement between existing competitors.”21  
For procedural reasons, however, the court ultimately did not have to answer 
this crucial single-entity question.22  The U.S. Supreme Court then refused to 
grant certiorari to the appeal brought by the players.23  Therefore, the trial 
court’s ruling, according to which MLS is qualified as a single-entity due to 
                                                
17. Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091, 1099 (1st Cir. 1994); see Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 538 F.3d 
737, 743 (7th Cir. 2008). 
18. See Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C. (Fraser I), 97 F. Supp. 2d 130, 139 (D. Mass. 
2000). 
19. Id. at 135. 
20. See Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C. (Fraser II), 284 F.3d 47, 58 (1st Cir. 2002). 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 60–61. 
23. Fraser v. Major League Soccer (Fraser III), 537 U.S. 885, 885 (2002). 
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unity of interests shared by the league and its individual investors, remained in 
full force and effect. 
Thus, unlike any other American sports league, MLS has managed to  
conclusively and comprehensively defend itself against an antitrust challenge 
by successfully invoking the single-entity immunity.24  This early victory in 
court affirmed the league’s significant strategic and operational leeway, which 
the league would widely make use of in the following years.   
 
III.  THE SINGLE-ENTITY PERSPECTIVE IS OUTDATED 
In its twenty-one years, MLS has undergone a predominantly positive  
development, characterized by steady and sustainable growth.  The league has 
made significant strides in terms of sporting quality and international rele-
vance.  In the 2016 season, the average attendance amounted to a remarkable 
number of 21,692; compared to other leagues in world soccer, MLS is ranked 
sixth in terms of attendance.25  The league has also continuously expanded into 
other domestic geographic markets.  Since MLS’ inaugural season, the number 
of teams has more than doubled to twenty-two, equally divided into an Eastern 
and Western Conference.  Also, three Canadian teams (Montreal Impact, To-
ronto FC, and Vancouver Whitecaps FC) are part of MLS. 
The league generates more and more revenues from sponsorship deals.   
Additionally, MLS has managed to enter into lucrative broadcasting  
agreements, which are estimated to yield on average USD 90 million per sea-
son until 2022.26  Meanwhile, both the league overall and the majority of the 
teams seem to operate at a profit.27  In 2016, the teams reported an estimated 
average market value of USD 185 million, 80% more than three years earli-
                                                
24. Fraser II, 284 F.3d at 59.  Selectively concerning league-wide restrictions of local television 
broadcasts by so-called “Super Stations,” the NBA was qualified as a single-entity.  However, the 
court explicitly abstained from any generalization, in particular regarding the players’ market.  Chi. 
Prof'l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 600 (7th Cir. 1996). 
25. See Jeff Carlisle, MLS Sets Average Attendance Record in 2016 as Seattle Sounders Lead All 
Clubs, ESPN FC (Oct. 24, 2016), http://www.espnfc.com/major-league-soccer/story/2980505/mls-
sets-average-attendance-record-in-2016-as-seattle-sounders-lead-all-clubs. 
26. Chris Smith, Major League Soccer's Most Valuable Teams 2015, FORBES (Aug. 19. 2015), 
www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2015/08/19/major-league-soccers-most-valuable- 
teams-2015-2/#4352ae883ba4. 
27. MLS as a privately held company does not publicly communicate its financial results.  The as-
sumption of economic success is based on publicly available indicators.  See Joseph Lennarz,  
Growing Pains: Why Major League Soccer's Steady Rise Will Bring Structural Changes in 2015, 16 
U. DENV. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 137, 171–73 (2014); see also Chris Smith, Major League Soccer’s 
Most Valuable Teams 2016: New York, Orlando Thrive in First Seasons, FORBES (Sept. 7, 2016), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2016/09/07/major-league-soccers-most-valuable-teams-2016-
new-york-orlando-thrive-in-first-seasons/#6d5185a8266a. 
DECURTINS 27.2 FINAL - COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/19/17  9:53 AM 
2017] MLS IN FIFA’S TRANSFER SYSTEM  337 
er.28 
Meanwhile, the pool of investor-operators has greatly expanded and  
diversified.  The twenty-two teams are now operated by many independent  
investors.  Initially, only a handful of investors and, due to lack of interest, 
even the league itself operated several teams.29  Over the coming two years, 
two  
additional investors are expected to enter MLS with their teams: Los Angeles 
FC in the 2018 season and a team from Miami in the 2019 season.  As de-
clared by MLS, the long-term goal is to expand to twenty-eight teams.30 
Due to increased opportunities for individual revenue generation, there are 
wide disparities in the financial resources of the teams today despite still  
existing league-wide redistribution mechanisms.  An important factor is that  
today most teams play in soccer-specific stadiums and no longer in leased 
American football stadiums, which were oversized for the existing fan interest.  
This not only provides for a more attractive soccer experience for spectators, 
but it also gives investors additional opportunities for individual revenues and 
influence, as they are responsible for the planning, financing, and operation of 
the stadiums themselves.31  Investors also make money from selling to spon-
sors the right to have the name on the stadium.  Furthermore, MLS teams since 
the 2006 season are allowed to advertise sponsorship on their jerseys, which is 
unique for American sports teams.32  All these sources of revenue are individ-
ual in nature and mainly benefit the stronger teams in more populated areas. 
The basic concept of a balanced league for the benefit of all is increasingly 
sidelined due to such individual opportunities to generate revenues.  The team 
operators hire their own technical directors, who are charged with forming the 
most successful and attractive team possible by means of skillful player  
transactions.  A milestone in this development was the introduction of the  
“Designated Player Rule”33 at the end of 2006, which shortly afterwards al-
lowed the league to facilitate the transfer of David Beckham to the Los Ange-
les  
Galaxy.  With a purported salary of USD 250 million over five years, this  
transfer would not have been permitted under the existing salary cap.  Ever 
                                                
28. Smith, supra note 27.  
29. See About Major League Soccer, PRESS BOX, http://pressbox.mlssoccer.com/content/about-
major-league-soccer (last visited May 15, 2017).  
30. See 2017 MLS Season Brochure, MLSSOCCER, 
http://www.mlssoccer.com/post/2017/01/01/2017-mls-season-brochure (last visited May 15, 2017). 
31. See Thomas D. Stuck, Comment, Facilities Issues in Major League Soccer: What Do Soccer 
Stadiums Have to Do with Antitrust Liability?, 14 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 551, 551 (2004). 
32. See Taylor, supra note 4, at 14. 
33. See infra Part IV.C. 
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since, the Designated Players Rule has allowed a team to engage up to three 
players who are not subject to the salary cap.  In addition, all teams today run 
their own youth academies and farm teams for purposes of forming and  
recruiting talented players for their MLS team roster. 
In retrospect: initially, a single-entity structure featuring redistribution 
mechanisms and centralized control was supposed to facilitate an overall  
sustainable growth of the league.  Over the last twenty-one years, however, 
MLS’ economic reality has changed.  Today’s pool of investors is more  
heterogeneous.  The investors are increasingly pursuing separate interests and 
running their business independently.34  The progressive growth of MLS and 
the fact that today the majority of the teams even seem to be profita-
ble⎯which would rather be the exception in the international soccer busi-
ness35—diminishes the need for financial stabilization for purposes of joint 
growth and mutual  
support.36  Irrespective of a changed economic reality, the league’s single-
entity structure is still in place today.  This protectionist and centralist attitude 
of MLS particularly manifests itself in its transfer system, which is still char-
acterized by strong regulation to the detriment of the players. 
In the following sections, MLS’ unique current transfer system will be  
examined in greater detail.  As will be described, it significantly differs from 
the transfer system in European soccer and, therefore, is increasingly coming 
under pressure. 
 
IV.  CORNERSTONES OF MLS’ TRANSFER SYSTEM  
 
A.     Basis in a Collective Bargaining Agreement 
The major American sports leagues have a long tradition of player un-
ions.37  In 2003, in the wake of the unsuccessful antitrust challenge to the 
league  
structure, MLS players similarly formed a union under the National Labor  
                                                
34. See Lennarz, supra note 27, at 197–98. 
35. See, e.g., SIMON KUPER & STEFAN SZYMANSKI, SOCCERONOMICS 49–71 (3d ed. 2014). 
36. See Coppage, supra note 7, at 558–59; see also Mark W. Lenihan, Major League Soccer 
Scores an Own Goal: A Successful Joint Venture Attains Market Power in an International Sport, 62 
DEPAUL L. REV. 881, 893–97 (2013). 
37. The first form of a players' union dates back to 1885.  See Our History, MLB PLAYERS ASS’N, 
http://www.mlbplayers.com/ViewArticle.dbml?ATCLID=211042995&DB_OEM_ID=34000 (last 
visited May 15, 2017).  For collective bargaining in American sports leagues, see WEILER ET AL., 
supra note 9, at 97–99. 
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Relations Act (NLRA).38  Ever since, the Major League Soccer Players Union 
(MLSPU) has been entitled as the players’ exclusive bargaining representative 
to collectively bargain with MLS on employment law matters.39  The currently 
applicable collective bargaining agreement (CBA 2015) was entered into un-
der great negotiation pressure only two days before the start of the 2015 sea-
son; it remains in full force and effect up to and including the 2019 season.40 
The CBA 2015 contains mandatory minimum employment-related rights 
and obligations applicable to all MLS players.41  Furthermore, it governs the 
league schedule and disciplinary proceedings, as well as the elaborate system 
for player allocation and compensation. 
 
B.    Key Question: Reserve Clause System or Free Agency? 
In terms of freedom of contract, the major American sports leagues  
generally keep their players on a relatively short leash.  Historically, the “re-
serve clause system” used to be the predominant form of organization.42  In 
this  
system, the fate of a player’s career was largely determined by the clubs  
themselves.  Firstly, they would acquire a player’s services within the  
framework of a league-wide draft.  Subsequently, they would retain the rights 
to them as long as they like.  Upon the expiration of a first-time contract term, 
each year the club would have the right to exercise a unilateral option for  
renewed employment on equal terms.  As such system artificially prevents  
competition for players, this would almost inevitably lead to lower wages.  
The reserve clause system’s counterpart is “free agency,” which is preferred 
by the players as it allows out-of-contract players to freely choose their new 
employer, negotiate a salary in line with the market, and transfer between 
clubs free of a transfer fee. 
Repeatedly, the players across all major sports leagues have pursued their 
free agency claims by judicial process, and at the negotiating table the players’ 
unions have obtained concessions from the leagues in this regard.43  Thus, over 
                                                
38. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2016). 
39. Id. §158(d). 
40. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER AND MAJOR 
LEAGUE SOCCER PLAYERS UNION art. 3, § 3.1 (2015) [hereinafter CBA 2015], 
http://www.mlsplayers.org/images/Collective%20Bargaining%20Agreement%20-
%20February%201,%202015.pdf. 
41. See id. art. 1, § 1.1. 
42. For reserve system and free agency, see WEILER ET AL., supra note 9, at 153–55, 350–52. 
43. Free agency was first established in Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 621−22 (8th Cir. 1976); see 
supra Part II.B.  
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the course of the past decades, the needle has continuously moved from re-
serve clause system to free agency.  In the meantime, all four major American 
sports leagues recognize free agency to varying degrees, at least for certain  
seniority-based player categories.44 
By contrast, MLS today is still strongly characterized by the reserve clause 
system.  Since the last round of CBA negotiations, a “restricted free agency” is 
available only for players who are at least twenty-eight years of age and who 
have already been playing in the league for eight years.45  Such out-of-contract 
players may enter into a new contract with a MLS team of their choice.   
However, any resulting wage increase may only be within narrow margins.46  
Currently, only between 10–15% of MLS players meet these free agency  
criteria.47  Therefore, the majority of players do not benefit from this  
achievement. 
As a rule, players who are new to MLS cannot choose the team for which 
they will play.  Rather, the teams secure the services of graduates from NCAA 
college teams within the framework of the annual “SuperDraft.”48  Foreign  
players that laterally enter the league are assigned to the team who has first  
acquired the right to sign them,49 or a right of first refusal.50  When former 
MLS players at a later point in their career return to MLS, they are allocated to 
a team by way of an “allocation ranking.”51 
The standard player agreements with MLS, which are based on the CBA 
2015, are limited in duration.52  A maximum length is not stipulated.53  For 
most players, the contracts are “guaranteed,” which means that they cannot be  
terminated by the league “by virtue solely of the quality of the [p]layer’s  
                                                
44. See WEILER ET AL., supra note 9, at 154−55, 350. 
45. CBA 2015, supra note 40, art. 29, §§ 29.5(a)(1), 29.6(a)(i); MLS Roster Rules and Regula-
tions, MLSSOCCER (Feb. 1, 2017), http://www.mlssoccer.com/league/official-rules/mls-roster-rules-
and-regulations [hereinafter MLS Roster Rules]. 
46. Players who had earned between USD 100,000 and USD 200,000 per year, under normal  
circumstances, are only entitled to a salary increase of up to 20%. CBA 2015, supra note 40, art. 29, § 
29.6(b)(iii). 
47. Brian Straus, MLS CBA Deal Bob Foose Todd Dunivant, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Mar. 6, 
2015), http://www.si.com/planet-futbol/2015/03/06/mls-cba-deal-players-union-bob-foose-todd-
dunivant. 
48. See CBA 2015, supra note 40, art. 14, § 14.1(ii); MLS Roster Rules, supra note 45. 
49. See MLS Roster Rules, supra note 45.  
50. Id.  
51. Id.  
52. CBA 2015, supra note 40, art. 18, § 18.1(i). 
53. See id. art. 18, § 18.8; UNITED STATES SOCCER FEDERATION, INC. POLICY MANUAL 
(2015−16) Policy 601-3, § 1, http://www.ussoccer.com/~/media/files/governance/2015/2015-16-
policy-manual.pdf?la=en. 
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on-field performance or the fact that the [p]layer may have sustained an  
injury.”54  Without the player’s consent, a player under contract may be traded 
or loaned to another team in the league, provided that the league agrees (which 
usually is the case).55  Also, a team may buy a player out of a current con-
tract56 or place him on “waivers,” “at which point he is made available to all 
other clubs.”57 
Upon expiration of the agreed first-time contract term, a team may often 
make use of its unilateral option right for renewed employment.  However, 
this option right is limited by CBA 2015; the agreement with players who are 
at least twenty-four years of age with at least two years’ league experience in 
total may only be extended for two years at most.58  Players who are out of 
contract or whose options were not exercised, and who do not qualify as a free 
agent, may again be selected by another team by means of the “re-entry 
draft.”59  In this scenario, the former team retains a right of first refusal “pro-
vided attempts were made to re-sign the player.”60 
Overall, MLS’ reserve clause system has been somewhat weakened in the 
past rounds of CBA negotiations by features such as restricted free agency,  
limitation of the option right for renewed employment, and the re-entry draft.  
However, its contours are still clearly recognizable. 
 
C.    Selective Salary Cap  
CBA 2015 governs MLS players’ compensation in a detailed manner.  As 
is also common in other American sports leagues for purposes of artificially 
leveling the playing field, there is a salary cap.61  For the 2017 season, the  
per-team annual salary budget is USD 3.845 million; until the 2019 season the 
budget is planned to continuously increase to USD 4.24 million.62  Among  
others, this budget also includes any transfer fees for players from foreign 
leagues.63  No more than 12.5% of the salary budget (i.e., USD 480,625 per 
                                                
54. CBA 2015, supra note 40, art. 18, § 18.6(a).  
55. See id. art. 15, § 15.1; MLS Roster Rules, supra note 45. 
56. CBA 2015, supra note 40, art. 10, § 10.22; MLS Roster Rules, supra note 45. 
57. MLS Roster Rules, supra note 45. 
58. CBA 2015, supra note 40, art. 18, § 18.13(a). 
59. Id. art. 29, §§ 29.1, 29.4; MLS Roster Rules, supra note 45. 
60. MLS Roster Rules, supra note 45. 
61. For information on salary caps in other American sports leagues, see WEILER ET AL., supra 
note 9, at 256–58. 
62. CBA 2015, supra note 40, art. 10, § 10.6(a). 
63. Id. § 10.6(b). 
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year) may be accounted for one single player.64 
The league realized that a tight wage framework made imports of stars 
from the European top leagues unrealistic and that this negatively affected the 
league’s development.  Therefore, before the beginning of the 2007 season it 
introduced the Designated Player Rule, according to which the wages of up to 
three players per team may be excluded from the salary cap.65  Hence, league 
star players such as Kakà of Orlando City SC in the 2016 season earned an an-
nual salary of up to USD 7,167,500.66  This salary counts to the per-team sala-
ry budget only to the aforementioned 12.5% limit.67  Any further portion of the 
compensation (i.e., the bulk of the compensation) is paid by the club, and not 
by the league as it is for regular players.68 
The CBA minimum annual base salary for regular MLS players is only set 
at USD 65,000 for the 2017 season but will reach USD 70,250 in the 2019  
season.69  The average player salary, including the designated players, in the 
2016 season was USD 316,777.  The majority of players, however, earned less 
than that; the median salary was only USD 117,000.70  In the last few years, 
this has resulted in a dramatically increased wage gap among MLS players.  In 
the case of Orlando City SC, even among teammates there was an astounding 
pay gap of 115 to 1 in the 2016 season.  Kakà earned USD 7,167,500 which is 
106 times more than what his teammate Hadji Barry made (USD 67,062.50).71  
Given such a stark discrepancy, the relation between a player’s performance 
and salary gets lost.  This may also negatively affect a team’s sporting bal-
ance.72 
                                                
64. Id. § 10.6(c). 
65. MLS Roster Rules, supra note 45; CBA 2015, supra note 40, art. 10, § 10.19(f); see supra Part 
III. 
66. 2016 MLS Player Salaries, MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER PLAYERS UNION (Sept. 15, 2016), 
http://www.mlsplayers.org/images/September%2015%202016%20Salary%20Information%20-
%20By%20Club.pdf.  In addition to their annual salary, marquee players may also earn endorsement 
money from sponsors.  For example, in the 2016 season, Kakà approximately earned an additional 
USD 2 million in endorsement money.  See Christina Settimi, Major League Soccer’s Top-Earning 
Players, FORBES (Sept. 7, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/christinasettimi/2016/09/07/major-
league-soccers-top-earning-players/#21da99115bcc. 
67. CBA 2015, supra note 40, art. 10, § 10.6(d). 
68. MLS Roster Rules, supra note 45. 
69. CBA 2015, supra note 40, art. 10, § 10.1. 
70. Jeff Carlisle, Average MLS Salary Goes up, with Surprising Value Available Leaguewide, 
ESPN (May 19, 2016), www.espnfc.com/major-league-soccer/19/blog/post/2876311/average-mls-
salary-goes -up-with-surprising-value-available-league-wide.  Thus, an equal number of players earns 
more or less than USD 117,000.  See id. 
71. See 2016 MLS Player Salaries, supra note 66. 
72. See Lennarz, supra note 27, at 180–85; David Peisner, The Low-Budget, High-Pressure Life of 
an MLS Rookie, BUZZFEED (Nov. 1, 2013), https://www.buzzfeed.com/djpeisner/the-low-budget-
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V.  COMPARISON WITH THE EUROPEAN TRANSFER SYSTEM AND  
FIFA-TRANSFER REGULATIONS 
 
A.    MLS as a Part of FIFA’s Legal Framework 
MLS is a member of the USSF, which itself is a member association of 
FIFA and of the Confederation CONCACAF.73  Therefore, MLS is part of the 
FIFA family and is “obliged to respect the statutes, regulations, directives, and 
decisions of FIFA.”74  With regards to international transfers, MLS is subject 
to the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (FIFA-Transfer 
Regulations).75  International transfers are those between foreign leagues and 
MLS.76  Transfers between Canadian and American MLS teams also fall into 
this category.77  By contrast, the FIFA-Transfer Regulations do not directly  
apply to local transfers, i.e., national transfers between MLS teams.  Rather, 
the member associations are mandated to adopt specific national regulations 
for  
local transfers, whereby such regulations must include some binding minimum 
requirements of the FIFA-Transfer Regulations.78 
 
B.    Post-Bosman Free Agency and FIFA-Transfer Regulations 
In European soccer, unrestricted free agency has existed since the  
groundbreaking Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Ass’n v. Bosman 
decision of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 1995.79  Ever since,  
out-of-contract professional soccer players in the European Union may freely 
choose their new employer, negotiate a salary in line with the market, and  
                                                                                                                 
high-pressure-life-of-an-mls-rookie?utm_term=.dcapWO5o8#.idnokvxj2. 
73. The Confederation of North, Central America and Caribbean Association Football is the  
continental governing body for association football in North America, that includes Central America 
and the Caribbean regions. 
74. BYLAWS OF THE UNITED STATES SOCCER FEDERATION, INC. art. 103 (2015), 
http://www.ussoccer.com/~/media/files/governance/2015/2015-16-bylaw-book.pdf?la=en; See CBA 
2015, supra note 40, art. 5, § 5. 
75. REGULATIONS ON THE STATUS AND TRANSFER OF PLAYERS art. 1.1 (2016) [hereinafter  
FIFA-Transfer Regulations], http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/02 
/70/95/52/regulationsonthestatusandtransferofplayersjune2016_e_neutral.pdf; CBA 2015,  
supra note 40, art. 15, § 15.5. 
76. See FIFA-Transfer Regulations, supra note 75, art. 9.1.  
77. The three Canadian teams are members of the Canadian Soccer Association (CSA). 
78. FIFA-Transfer Regulations, supra note 75, art. 1.2. 
79. See Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Ass’n v. Bosman, 1995 
E.C.R. I-04921. 
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transfer between clubs free of a transfer fee.  This ECJ decision also banned 
restrictions on foreign European Union players within national leagues, which 
had previously existed in European soccer.  This decision primarily benefited 
players from European Union countries and from countries who have entered 
into freedom of movement treaties with the European Union (e.g.,  
Switzerland).80  Subsequently, the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS)81 has 
selectively also applied these freedoms to other countries.82 
In the wake of the Bosman decision, FIFA was forced to amend its rules 
on international transfers in order to reflect the changed power balance be-
tween the clubs and players.  Hence, the currently applicable FIFA-Transfer 
Regulations provide that players shall be bound by their clubs for a fixed term 
only, normally for a maximum of five years,83 and will then be free to transfer 
to another team free of a transfer fee.84  While protection of contractual stabil-
ity is a core  
principle of the FIFA-Transfer Regulations, both parties are granted certain 
rights to an early termination of the contract on an exceptional basis.85  Trans-
fers of players under contract against a transfer fee (or loans against a loan fee,  
respectively) are permitted, as long as they occur for the duration of the bian-
nual national transfer windows.86  Regardless of whether the transfer takes 
                                                
80. The impact of UK’s vote of June 23, 2016 on exiting the European Union (“Brexit”) on free 
agency of European players in the Premier League is not clear at this stage but may be severe.  See 
generally Bobby McMahon, 11 Ways Brexit Will Impact the Premier League and Soccer Worldwide, 
FORBES (June 24, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/bobbymcmahon/2016/06/24/this-week-in-
soccer-biz-special-11-ways-brexit-vote-will-impact-premier-league-and-soccer-
worldwide/#773495b52513; Cristina Criddle, What Will Brexit Mean for the Premier League?, 
TELEGRAPH (June 24, 2016), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/football/2016/06/21/what-would-brexit-
mean-for-the-premier-league/. 
81. The CAS, headquartered in Lausanne, Switzerland, is an international, independent institution 
established to resolve legal disputes in the field of sport through arbitration or mediation.  In sections 
57–59 of its Statutes, FIFA explicitly recognizes CAS’s jurisdiction over FIFA matters.  FIFA 
STATUTES art. 2, ¶ 15(f) (Apr. 2016 ed 2016), 
http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/generic/02/78/29/07/fifastatutsweben_neutral.pd
f. 
82. See generally Club Atlético Peñarol v. Suárez, CAS 2005/A/983 & 984.  In this judgment, the 
so-called “South American Bosman,” unilateral options that were valid according to national rules on 
transfers of the Uruguayan Association were declared invalid due to a conflict with the FIFA-Transfer 
Regulations and international law principles (i.e., freedom of movement for free agents).  See JUAN 
DE DIOS CRESPO PÉREZ, CAS AND FOOTBALL: LANDMARK CASES 116–18 (Alexander Wild ed., 
2012) [hereinafter PÉREZ]. 
83. FIFA-Transfer Regulations, supra note 75, art. 18.2.  
84. The Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players do not explicitly stipulate that the trans-
fer of a free agent must be free of a transfer fee.  Nevertheless, see id. art. 9.1 (pursuant to which an  
international transfer certificate shall be issued free of charge). 
85. Id. arts. 13–17. 
86. See id. arts. 6.1−6.3. 
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place  
during or at the end of the player’s contract, the player’s new team under cer-
tain conditions may be required to pay training compensation87 or a solidarity  
contribution to the player’s former training club(s).88  
 
C.    Differences 
Unmistakably, MLS’ transfer system substantially differs in essential  
aspects from the post-Bosman transfer system in Europe and the FIFA-
Transfer Regulations. 
 
 1.   No Free Choice of Employer 
 In Europe, out-of-contract players may freely choose which team they 
want to sign on to next, but this is not the case in MLS.  Unlike in Europe, 
MLS players without their consent are assigned to teams by means of alloca-
tion mechanisms that are centrally controlled by the league (e.g., SuperDraft,  
re-entry draft, or allocation ranking).89 
 
 2.   Salary Limitations 
The salary of MLS players (with the exception of the Designated Players) 
is not the result of supply and demand, as in Europe, but factually is limited by 
the lack of competition for players.  Even for free agents, any salary increase 
resulting from a transfer to a new team may only be within narrow margins.90  
Additionally, salaries are limited by the team-specific salary cap.  On the other 
hand, a minimum annual base salary is provided for in the CBA 2015.91  By 
contrast, collective salary regulations are a foreign concept in European 
leagues.  The sole safeguard for some competitive balance is the Financial Fair 
Play  
Regulations of UEFA,92 pursuant to which clubs must not spend more than 
they earn.93 
                                                
87. Id. art. 20. 
88. Id. art. 21. 
89. See supra Part IV.B. 
90. Id. 
91. See supra Part IV.C. 
92. The Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) is the administrative body for associa-
tion football in Europe. 
93. UEFA CLUB LICENSING AND FINANCIAL FAIR PLAY REGULATIONS (2015), 
http://www.uefa.org/MultimediaFiles/Download/Tech/uefaorg/General/02/26/77/91/2267791_DOW
DECURTINS 27.2 FINAL - COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/19/17  9:53 AM 
346 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 27:2 
 
 3.   Lack of Self-Determination for Players Under Contract 
 In Europe, players under contract cannot be transferred or loaned to anoth-
er club without their consent.  In MLS, however, the players have no say in 
trade or loan deals to other league teams during the term of their contract.94  
Also, they may not be “solicited” during the term of their contract; transfers in  
exchange for a cash compensation are not permitted within MLS.95 
 
 4.   Termination Rights to the Player’s Disadvantage  
FIFA requires that the national associations “include in [their] regulations 
appropriate means to protect contractual stability[,]” with equal consideration 
given to teams’ and players’ interests.96  However, in the CBA 2015, MLS  
players are granted virtually no rights in respect to an early termination of the 
contract on an exceptional basis.97  In addition, a (small) number of the play-
ers' contracts still are only "semi-guaranteed,” which means that those con-
tracts  
during a certain timeframe may be arbitrarily terminated by the league without 
compensation should the player fail “to exhibit sufficient skill or competitive 
ability.”98  Furthermore, the league may terminate a player contract for  
disciplinary reasons should a player be found guilty of off-field conduct that is 
“detrimental to the public image and/or reputation of MLS, the Team and/or 
the game of soccer.”99 
 
 5.   Limits on Foreign Players 
 The number of foreign players in MLS is currently limited to a total of 
176.  Roster spots for foreigners are tradable.  There are now teams with more 
or less than the originally allocated eight foreigner roster spots.  There is no  
team-specific limit on foreign players or a minimum number of locally trained 
                                                                                                                 
NLOAD.pdf. 
94. See supra Part IV.B. 
95. Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C. (Fraser I), 97 F. Supp. 2d 130, 133 (D. Mass. 2000). 
96. See FIFA-Transfer Regulations, supra note 75, art. 1.3(b).  
97. A player’s only possibility of a unilateral early termination is if MLS defaults in its obligation 
to pay the player’s salary.  CBA 2015, supra note 40, art. 18, § 18.4. 
98. Id. art. 18, § 18.7(i). 
99. Id.  art. 20, § 20.2 (ii)(a).  This provision includes a list of possible violations, such as being 
tested positive for a banned substance, betting, match-fixing, failure to maintain an appropriate level 
of physical and mental condition and refusal to report to work.  Id. § 20.2(ii)(b)(i)-(ii), (viii)-(ix). 
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players, respectively.100  By contrast, since the Bosman decision, quotas for  
European players are taboo in Europe.101  Conversely, however, many leagues 
since then demand a minimum number of locally trained roster players.102   
Today, quotas still exist for third country nationals.103 
 
 6.   Questionable Elements of Reserve Clause System 
 The CBA 2015 does not stipulate a maximum length of player con-
tracts.104  Based on publicly available information, however, it appears that in 
practice the maximum period of five years as required by FIFA105 usually is 
not exceeded.  In addition, according to the CBA 2015, the teams are entitled 
to a limited  
number of unilateral annual options for renewed employment.106  It is  
questionable whether these are permissible by FIFA’s legal framework.  The 
CAS has closely examined such unilateral options on a case-by-case basis; in 
certain cases it has prohibited the exercise of such options.107  Furthermore, it 
is questionable whether the right of first refusal of the former club provided 
for by the CBA 2015 is compatible with FIFA’s legal framework.108 
 
 7.   No Training Compensation and Solidarity Contributions 
FIFA mandates that national associations provide “a system to reward 
clubs investing in the training and education of young players.”109  The USSF 
and MLS, however, have not implemented such a system.  They argue that due 
to a procedural settlement in the context of the former antitrust proceedings, 
                                                
100. The only relevant regulation there is, is the requirement that Canadian clubs must have at 
least three Canadian roster players.  MLS Roster Rules, supra note 45. 
101. See supra Part V.B. 
102. E.g., the UEFA Homegrown Player Rule for the Champions League. REGULATIONS OF THE 
UEFA CHAMPIONS LEAGUE 2015−18 CYCLE: 2016/17 SEASON, art. 43.02, 
http://www.uefa.com/MultimediaFiles/Download/Regulations/uefaorg/Regulations/02/35/87/89/2358
789_DOWNLOAD.pdf. 
103. E.g., SWISS FOOTBALL LEAGUE, REGULATIONS FOR THE LEAGUE OPERATION OF SFL, art. 3 
(2015). 
104. See supra Part IV.B. 
105. FIFA-Transfer Regulations, supra note 75, art. 18.2 . 
106. See supra Part IV.B. 
107. Club Atlético Boca Juniors v. Genoa Cricket and Football Club S.p.A, CAS 2006/A/1157; 
Panathinaikos Football Club v. S., CAS 2005/A/973; see  PÉREZ, supra note 82. 
108. See supra Part IV.B; see also Omar Hafez Ayad, Take the Training Wheels Off the League: 
Major League Soccer's Dysfunctional Relationship with the International Soccer Transfer System, 10 
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 413, 432 (2008). 
109. FIFA-Transfer Regulations, supra note 75, art. 1.2. 
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they would not be allowed to pay “transfer fees.”  Consequently, payments of  
training compensation to American or foreign clubs would not be possible.110  
American training clubs challenge USSF and MLS on this point and have  
initiated proceedings with FIFA’s Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC).111  
Their separate class action lawsuit with the U.S. Court for the Eastern District 
of Texas has recently been dismissed.112  In any event, it remains to be seen 
how this issue will evolve. 
 
D.    International Transfers from or to MLS Clubs: Particularities 
International transfers, i.e., transfers between foreign leagues and MLS on 
the basis of the FIFA-Transfer Regulations, are located at the interface be-
tween MLS’ transfer system and international practices.  Accordingly, they 
have the particular feature that the contractual partner of foreign clubs is MLS 
and not one of its teams.113  The league pays any applicable transfer fee for a 
purchase from abroad from league funds and it determines which MLS team 
the player will play for.114  Only Designated Players are usually free to choose 
their MLS team themselves.115 
A transfer of an MLS player to a club abroad is only made in agreement 
between MLS and that player.116  For players under contract, MLS usually 
would demand a transfer fee.  The bulk of this fee is allocated to the player’s 
last MLS team,117 10% of the fee to the player himself, and the rest to the 
                                                
110. See supra Part II.B; see Luca Smacchia, Difficulties Claiming Training Compensation in US 
Soccer, 13 WORLD SPORTS L. REP., 6, 6−7 (2015). 
111. See Jorge Arangure Jr., Youth Clubs File Class Action Lawsuit vs. MLS Players Union and 
Dempsey, Yedlin and Bradley, VICE SPORTS (Jul. 1, 2016), 
https://sports.vice.com/en_us/article/youth-clubs-class-action-mls-players-union-dempsey-yedlin-
bradley-solidarity-payments/; see also Howard Walker, Pay Us!, JAMAICAOBSERVER (Jan. 28, 2015), 
http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/sport 
/Pay-us-. 
112. Dallas Texans Soccer Club v. Major League Soccer Players Union, No. 4:16-CV-00464, 
2017 WL 1165662 at *5 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2017); Fola Akinnibi, MLS Union Sheds Suit over Youth 
Soccer Training Fees, LAW360 (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/907778/mls-union-
sheds-suit-over-youth-soccer-training-fees. 
113. See CBA 2015, supra note 40, arts. 15, 18, §§ 15.2, 18.1(ii). 
114.  Id. art. 15, § 15.1. 
115. See supra Parts IV.B–C; in theory, the league may also intervene with these transfers, but it 
wisely refrains from doing so, see Steven Gerrard's Transfer to Major League Soccer, ANDREW 
VISNOVSKY (Jan. 21, 2015), https://andrewvisnovsky.wordpress.com/2015/01/21/steven-gerrard-and-
transfer-of-players-between-the-mls-and-other-leagues/. 
116. CBA 2015, supra note 40, art. 15, § 15.2; see supra Part IV.B. 
117. See CBA 2015, supra note 40, art. 10, § 10.19(e); see also MLS Roster Rules, supra note 45. 
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league.118 For out-of-contract players, MLS does not seem to demand a trans-
fer fee nor any training compensation or similar compensation.119 
 
VI.  HOW WILL MLS’S TRANSFER SYSTEM EVOLVE? 
 
MLS’ single-entity structure that is still in place today proves to be a tar-
get for attack not only because it differs significantly from international prac-
tices and restricts the autonomy of the players and teams drastically, but main-
ly also because it has a significant impact on the economic success of the 
various actors involved.  In the coming years, it will likely increasingly come 
under pressure from various stakeholders. 
 
A.    Pressure from Investors 
MLS League Commissioner Don Garber officially announced that the 
league intends to hold on to its single-entity structure for the years to come.120  
However, this will raise the question as to whether holding on to this  
organizational model also in the long run will prove to actually be in the best 
interest of the league and thus the investors. 
Increasingly, the league’s collective interests tend not to correspond to the 
interests of team operators.121  While the league promotes competitive balance, 
the investor would prefer to have the marquee player on his own team rather 
than on the opposing team.122  In recent years, there has been a great number 
of transfers, in which the league, according to arbitrarily established and more 
or less transparent criteria, decided over the heads of the investors on the allo-
cation of a player.  For example, during the 2012 season, MLS decided not to 
meet Toronto FC’s desire to sign the former Swedish star defender, Olof 
Mellberg.  This transfer apparently was not in the “league’s best interests,” 
i.e., not worthy of investment.123  Such seemingly arbitrary interference by the 
league at times may raise suspicion that for strategic reasons, teams in the key 
markets would be favored against teams in the periphery.  It goes without say-
                                                
118. CBA 2015, supra note 40, art. 15, § 15.3. 
119. Id. art. 15, § 15.4. 
120. See Jared E. Young, The MLS CBA: Unpacking Don Garber's Recent Comments on  
Single-entity, SB NATION: BROTHERLY GAME (Sept. 24, 2014, 10:00 AM), 
http://www.brotherlygame.com/2014/9/24/6836267/the-mls-cba-unpacking-don-garbers-recent-
comments-on-single-entity. 
121. See id. 
122. See Lennarz, supra note 27, at 176–78. 
123. See Cathal Kelly, Toronto FC's Hands Tied by Meddling MLS: Kelly, STAR (Oct. 28, 2012), 
www.thestar.com/sports/soccer/tfc/2012/10/28/toronto_fcs_hands_tied_by_meddling_mls_kelly.html. 
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ing that such  
interventions by the league have the potential to cause conflict.124 
Another challenge is MLS’ competitive disadvantage in the international 
transfer market due to its unique and player unfriendly transfer and salary  
system.125  Today, it proves to be difficult for MLS to attract mid-range for-
eign players without “top star status.”  In addition, even for talented American  
players, foreign leagues often offer better financial perspectives.  In the 2013 
season, MLS only spent about 20% of its total revenues on player salaries.  
This is a low amount compared to proportions of 40% and above in European 
leagues.126  Another obstacle is the unorthodox league schedule from March to 
December, which also for practical considerations makes transfers from other 
leagues difficult.127  A harmonization of MLS’ transfer system and league 
schedule with international practices, and the expected resulting increase in 
transfers of foreign players, would result in an additional increase of the 
league’s overall competitive level.128  This in turn would generate a larger  
national and international audience appeal, which again would be in the  
economic interest of the investors. 
MLS now seems to be stable enough for the club investors to engage in 
unfettered competition without centralized league control.129  An unfettered 
competition among the teams may also result in more legitimacy of the league 
with fans, players, and the international soccer community.130  It remains to be 
seen if and when the league will decide to take this step, potentially due to  
pressure by individual investors.  In any event, at the latest, when a new CBA 
will be negotiated before the 2020 season, the league, in its own interest,  
probably will be more susceptible to deregulation requests from its players. 
 
B.    Pressure from the Players 
                                                
124. See Geoff Gibson, Discovery Claims Are an Embarrassment to MLS, SB NATION: 
STUMPTOWN FOOTY (Feb. 16, 2013, 9:02 AM), http://www.stumptownfooty.com/2013/2/16/3995274 
/discover-claims-embarrassment-mls-portland-timbers; see also Hank Stebbins, Blind Draw: How  
Major League Soccer's Single Entity Structure and Unique Rules Have Impacted Soccer in the United 
States, 13 WILLAMETTE SPORTS L.J. 1, 31–35 (2015). 
125. See Lennarz, supra note 27, at 188, 192–94. 
126. See Is Greed Good?, Part II: Hey MLS Corporate, Ante up!, SHIN GUARDIAN (June 5, 2013), 
https://theshinguardian.com/2013/06/05/is-greed-good-part-ii-hey-mls-corporate ante up/. 
127. On the one hand, the MLS’ league schedule without summer break is due to climatic reasons 
and on the other hand, it is due to the fact that in the summer months the league does not face  
competition from the NFL, the NBA, and the NHL.  Taylor, supra note 4, at 9–10; see Lenihan, supra 
note 36, at 903–04. 
128. See Hafez Ayad, supra note 108, at 438–39. 
129. See Young, supra note 120. 
130. See Stebbins, supra note 124, at 39. 
DECURTINS 27.2 FINAL - COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/19/17  9:53 AM 
2017] MLS IN FIFA’S TRANSFER SYSTEM  351 
The players are subject to the CBA 2015 until the end of the 2019 sea-
son.131  Until then, neither a players’ strike nor a league lockout⎯as has hap-
pened in American sports history before, most recently in the NHL in 
2012⎯is  
allowed.132  Hence, the players union, MLSPU, will not again be in the posi-
tion to engage in collective bargaining with the league until the end of the 
2019  
season.  
In case of a deadlock in the CBA negotiations, it is not impossible that the 
players at that point will again try to bring down the single-entity system by 
means of an antitrust challenge in court.  At least at first glance this seems to 
be a viable option, as it is highly questionable whether given the changed eco-
nomic reality the league would still benefit from single-entity immunity in an-
titrust matters, as it did in the Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C. (Fraser 
I)  
decision of 2000.133  There are, however, high procedural hurdles for such  
proceedings.  According to established jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, for the duration of an existing CBA and also for a certain period after 
its expiration (provided that the players continue to be unionized and in a posi-
tion to collectively bargain with the league), a sports league is immune against  
antitrust lawsuits from the players.134  As a result, the only remaining option 
would be to formally decertify the union following the expiration of the CBA 
2015.  However, even this measure would remain ineffective if according to 
the court’s opinion the decertification were to merely be a tactical maneuver 
and, therefore, were not to actually signify the end of the collective bargaining  
relationship⎯a decision on a case-by-case basis.135  Although, it is also quite 
possible that at that time, due to changed circumstances and further conces-
sions of MLS to the players, an antitrust challenge would no longer be neces-
sary in the first place. 
 
C.    Pressure from FIFA or International Sports Courts 
The FIFA-Transfer Regulations aim to “establish basic principles that  
guarantee a uniform and equal treatment of all participants in the [soccer] 
                                                
131. See supra Part IV.A. 
132. CBA 2015, supra note 40, art. 6, §§ 6.1, 6.3. 
133. See supra Parts II.B, III. 
134. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 235−37 (1996); see also WEILER ET AL., su-
pra note 9, at 389–90. 
135. See WEILER ET AL., supra note 9, at 426–28. 
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world.”136  “As a general rule, FIFA does not interfere in the day-to-day busi-
ness of the associations,” and allows them “to adapt their own regulations to 
the[ir] particular conditions and circumstances[,]” “provided that severe in-
fringements of the FIFA statutes and/or regulations do not occur.”137  “The au-
tonomy of the associations is, however, limited by the basic principles of the 
[r]egulations that have to be observed at all times and in particular by those 
provisions that are . . . binding at the national level and [must] be included 
without modification in the association’s regulations.”138 
As outlined above, MLS’ transfer system contrasts with the practices in  
international soccer and with the FIFA-Transfer Regulations.139  A national  
single-entity structure and a protectionist and centralized transfer policy, as 
that of MLS, are not explicitly prohibited in FIFA’s legal framework.  Howev-
er, implicitly, this system seems to be incompatible with the spirit and purpose 
of the FIFA-Transfer Regulations, which are based on an equal consideration 
of clubs’ and players’ interests.140  Moreover, contrary to the FIFA mandate, 
the USSF and MLS have failed to comprehensively implement nationally 
binding regulations, such as a system of rewarding training clubs,141 appropri-
ate means to protect contractual stability,142 and a ban on “third-party owner-
ships.”143 
In the event that FIFA would want to urge MLS to harmonize its transfer 
policy, there would probably be a basis in FIFA’s legal framework to do so.  
However, it is not realistic that in the short and medium term FIFA will put 
any increased pressure on the USSF and MLS in a call for harmonization.  As 
far as can be seen, FIFA has largely not interfered with the USSF and MLS’ 
internal matters in the past twenty-one years.  In the early 1990s, it was FIFA 
that had initiated a renewed attempt for professional soccer in the U.S., after 
all.144  The subsequent positive development of the league and of soccer in the 
                                                
136. See COMMENTARY ON THE REGULATIONS FOR THE STATUS AND TRANSFER OF PLAYERS, 
art. 1, ¶ 2, 
http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/51/56/07/transfer_commentary_0
6_en_1843.pdf  (last visited May 15, 2017) [hereinafter Transfer Regulations-Commentary] (empha-
sis added). 
137. Id. art. 1, ¶ 2(1). 
138. Id. art. 1, ¶ 2(2). 
139. See supra Part V.C. 
140. See Hafez Ayad, supra note 108, at 430–34. 
141. See supra Part V.C.7. 
142. See supra Part V.C.4. 
143. FIFA-Transfer Regulations, supra note 75, art. 18ter.1; see W. Tyler Hall, Comment, After 
the Ban: The Financial Landscape of International Soccer After Third-Party Ownership, 94 OR. L. 
REV. 179, 180 (2015). 
144. See supra Part II.A. 
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U.S. in  
general has been in FIFA’s best interests too. 
At most, FIFA’s position towards MLS may change if one day MLS, due 
to a further increase in success, actually were to be in a position to directly 
compete with the major European leagues, and thereby in the eyes of FIFA in 
a distortive manner would benefit from its single-entity structure⎯e.g., due to 
the  
possibility of paying transfer fees from league funds.145 
The transfer system itself may possibly be attacked by invoking sports 
courts.146  For this to happen, one would need to find a foreign MLS play-
er⎯an “MLS-Bosman”⎯that would be prepared to initiate employment-
related  
proceedings against his MLS team with FIFA’s DRC.147  However, the DRC 
would only be competent to hear the case if it took the view that MLS’ internal 
arbitration pursuant to CBA 2015 does not comply with FIFA’s requirement of 
independent and fair national proceedings that respect the principle of equal 
representation of players and clubs.  MLS’ internal arbitration only provides 
for one impartial arbitrator whose judgment furthermore must be within the  
framework of the CBA 2015.148  FIFA, however, expressly requires an  
arbitration tribunal composed of members chosen in equal number by players 
and clubs with an independent chairman, i.e., a tribunal of no less than three 
people.149  In previous proceedings, the DRC has strictly applied this  
requirement.150  Materially, one would argue that elements of MLS’ transfer 
policy, such as unilateral options rights, rights of first refusal, one-sided  
                                                
145. See supra Part V.D. 
146. See Andrew Visnovsky, FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber Jurisdiction over MLS Contract 
Disputes, ANDREW VISNOVKSY (Feb. 1, 2015), https://andrewvisnovsky.wordpress.com/2015/02/01/ 
jurisdiction-of-the-fifa-dispute-resolution-chamber/; see also Andrew Visnovsky, The 2015 MLS 
CBA, Bosman, and How European Law Affects Free Agency in American Soccer, ANDREW 
VISNOVSKY (Feb. 22, 2015), https://andrewvisnovsky.wordpress.com/2015/02/22/the-2015-mls-cba-
bosman-and-how-european-law-affects-free-agency-in-american-soccer/. 
147. FIFA-Transfer Regulations, supra note 75, arts. 22.b, 24.1.  There would already be an  
international dimension if the plaintiff player is a non-American or a non-Canadian for Canadian 
teams, respectively.  See Transfer Regulations-Commentary, supra note 136, art. 22.b. 
148. CBA 2015, supra note 40, art. 21, §§ 21.6, 21.8. 
149. Transfer Regulations-Commentary, supra note 136, art. 24, ¶ 2; NATIONAL DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION CHAMBER (NDRC) STANDARD REGULATIONS, art. 3, ¶¶ 1, 3, http://resources.fifa. 
com/mm/document/affederation/administration/67/18/19/national_dispute_resolution_efsd_47338.pdf 
(last visited May 15, 2017); Memorandum from Urs Linsi, Gen. Sec’y, to the Members of FIFA and 
the Confederations (Dec. 20, 2005), http://goldengate-
law.com/pdf/fifa_circular/fifa_circular_1010.pdf. 
150. See Player J. v. Club A., Case No. 8122302 (FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber Aug. 17, 
2012), http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/01/96/95/56//8122302.pdf. 
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termination rights, or lack of player’s self-determination,151 violate the  
FIFA-Transfer Regulations or principles of international law in light of the 
Bosman decision.152  A judgment of DRC may be appealed to CAS.153 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 
 
MLS’ founding fathers learned from historical mistakes and designed the 
league as a single-entity with league-wide redistribution mechanisms and  
centralized control.  These measures, aimed at overall and sustainable eco-
nomic development, have paid off.  In the past twenty-one years, MLS has de-
veloped positively and, financially, it seems to be on a solid track.  The league 
aims for further growth and pursues the self-proclaimed ambitious goal to be-
come one of the major soccer leagues in the world by 2022.154  The enabling 
conditions for this endeavor seem to be in place: financially strong investors; a 
large market for sponsorship and broadcasting revenues; soccer-specific stadi-
ums; a  
functioning youth development concept; the U.S. as an attractive destination 
for players; as well as the country’s growing soccer affinity, in particular with 
the younger generation and Latin American immigrants.155 
The decisive factor for MLS’ future success is likely going to be how it 
will be able to position itself in the international transfer market in the upcom-
ing years.  At this, its unique single-entity structure and player unfriendly 
transfer system may prove to be a competitive disadvantage and an obstacle in 
the league’s further growth and expansion plans.  Therefore, it seems to be 
merely a matter of time until MLS will get rid of its “single-entity training 
wheels.”156  In any event, it seems likely that MLS’ investors in their own in-
terests will be more susceptible to free agency requests from the players’ side 
in the next CBA negotiations after the 2019 season.  In this scenario, the “sin-
gle-entity problem” may one day be solved by itself, without being prompted 
by a court judgment or an intervention by FIFA.  Regardless, it will be inter-
                                                
151. See supra Part V.C. 
152. Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Ass’n v. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 
I-04921. 
153. See FIFA-Transfer Regulations, supra note 75, art. 24.2. 
154. See Smith, supra note 2. 
155. See KUPER & SZYMANSKI, supra note 35, at 407, 414; see also GARY HOPKINS,  
STAR-SPANGLED SOCCER: THE SELLING, MARKETING AND MANAGEMENT OF SOCCER IN THE USA 
285–87 (2010); Soccer Flourishes: Kick Turn, ECONOMIST (May 26, 2016), 
http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21699484-more-and-more-americans-watching-
people-kick-round-balls-kick-turn. 
156. See Coppage, supra note 7, at 559, 561, 563; Hafez Ayad, supra note 108, at 442−44. 
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esting to follow the  
development of MLS in the upcoming years, both from a sport and a structural 
perspective, and to see how MLS’ balancing act between a league in a U.S. 
sports environment and a league as part of the FIFA framework will evolve. 
